Indirect Reference in .NET Generating qr bidimensional barcode in .NET Indirect Reference

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Indirect Reference generate, create quick response code none in .net projects Microsoft Office Official Website Principles 3.6.1 and .

NET qr codes 3.6.2, which connect up sense and reference, together with Principles 3.

6.3 and 3.6.

4, which govern sense, enable us to derive Frege s two fundamental principles governing reference: Principle 2.3.1 (Compositionality for Reference) For any functionexpression ( ) and any name , r( ( )) = r( )[r( )], and Principle 2.

3.3 (Extensionality for Reference) For any functionexpression ( ) and any names , , if r( ) = r( ), then r( ( )) = r( ( )). Principle 2.

3.1 says that all signi cant parts of the sentence refer. Principle 2.

3.3 de nes the functional relation between the reference of a complex name and the reference of its constituent singular terms. A name is complex for Frege if, and only if, Principle 2.

3.3 holds for that name; so Principle 2.3.

3 actually serves, as we noted in Section 2.3, as a parsing principle for identifying the signi cant parts of a sentence. Principles 3.

6.3 and 2.3.

1 are frequently identi ed as Compositionality Principles. Principles 3.6.

4 and 2.3.3 are frequently identi ed as Substitution Principles.

These six principles form the heart of the sense/reference story. Let us now consider what happens when (9.1) is embedded in a that clause, as for example, in Ted Kennedy believes that Margaret Thatcher drives a Peugeot.

(9.2) We cannot replace Margaret Thatcher by just any coreferential singular term and preserve the truth value of the sentence. Nor can we replace the embedded sentence by just any sentence having the same truth value and preserve the truth value of (9.

2). Principles 2.3.

1 and 2.3.3 fail when a declarative sentence is embedded in a propositional attitude context; and since these are derived from Principles 3.

6.3 and 3.6.

4, Principles 3.6.3 and 3.

6.4 fail as well. Frege could not be satis ed with leaving the matter like this.

For one thing, he would be abandoning compositionality for a large class of sentences; and compositionality was a compelling idea for Frege (just as it is for many philosophers today). But there is another, more critical, reason. Frege had said that the sense of a declarative sentence is a thought or a proposition: this is what the sentence expresses.

Sentence (9.1) therefore expresses the proposition that Margaret Thatcher drives a Peugeot. Frege had to be able to tell a convincing story that expresses that and says that related a sentence (or person) to a proposition, or else his.

9.2 The Sense/Reference Story claim that a sentenc qr codes for .NET e expresses a proposition would be incomprehensible. And, of course, the same story would have to be told for the other propositional attitude verbs, because that is the role thoughts or propositions are supposed to play.

So the story Frege told about oblique contexts is not an afterthought or an add-on to the basic account; it is a central component of the picture. How did Frege handle these oblique contexts We gave the outlines of his treatment in Section 3.6.

Now we must look at it more closely. There are two parts to his solution. First, he says that that shifts the reference of the words in its scope, and, second, he relativizes reference to the context in which the term occurs.

The customary reference of the embedded sentence in (9.2) is its truth value; but it is not referring to its truth value in that context, so replacing it by an equipollent sentence need not preserve the truth value of (9.2).

Just because two names have the same customary reference, that is, the same reference in one kind of context, they need not have the same reference in every context in which they occur. But if two names have the same reference appropriate for the context in which they occur, then they are substitutable in that context salva veritate. The appropriate reference of a term embedded in a that clause is its indirect reference.

So the truth value of (9.2) is a function of the indirect reference of its constituent Margaret Thatcher , and substituting another term for Margaret Thatcher that has the same indirect reference should leave the truth value of (9.2) unchanged.

Compositionality is preserved: (9.2) is regarded as having parts whose reference contributes to determining the reference of the whole. Let us use s0 (t) and r0 (t) for the customary sense and reference, respectively, of t, and s1 (t) and r1 (t) for the indirect sense and reference, respectively, of t.

7 And let us abbreviate Ted Kennedy believes that ( ) to K . Then Frege s semantic analysis of (9.2) is given in Figure 9.

2. Let us introduce some more formalization just enough to clarify the analysis. First, we will use for that , with parentheses when needed to clarify scope.

Frege s view is that the indirect reference of an expression is what the expression refers to inside the scope of that . We will express this principle as follows: Principle 9.2.

1 (Indirect Reference) r1 (t) = r0 ( (t)). Principle 9.2.

1, in effect, de nes r1 (t), the indirect reference of a term t: the indirect reference is the customary reference of an expression inside.
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